We have studied two person stochastic di erential games with multiple modes. For the zero-sum game we have established the existence of optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero sum case we have proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
INTRODUCTION
We study a two-person stochastic di erential game with multiple modes.
The state of the system at time t is given by a pair (X(t); (t)) 2 R d S; S = f1; 2; ; Ng. The discrete component (t) describes the various modes of the system. The continuous component X(t) is governed by a \controlled di usion process" with a drift vector which depends on the discrete component (t). Thus X(t) switches from one di usion path to another at random times as the mode (t) changes. On the other hand, the discrete component (t) is a \controlled Markov chain" with a transition rate matrix depending on the continuous component. The evolution of the process (X(t); (t)) is governed by the following equations dX(t) = b(X(t); (t); u 1 (t); u 2 (t))dt + (X(t); (t))dW (t); P( (t + t) = j j (t) = i; X(s); (s); s t) = ij (X(t)) t + o( t); i 6 = j; W( ) is a standard Brownian motion, u 1 ( ) and u 2 ( ) nonanticipative processes taking values in prescribed sets U 1 and U 2 , respectively, which are admissible strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively. This kind of di erential game was rst studied by Basar and Haurie 1] for a piecewise deterministic case ( 0). They have studied feedback Stackelberg and Nash equilibria for a nonzero-sum game. Here we consider both zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. In a zero-sum game player 1 is trying to maximize his expected (discounted) payo E Z 1 0 e ? t r (X(t); (t); u 1 (t); u 2 (t))dt] over his admissible strategies, where > 0 is the discount factor and r is the payo function. Player 2 is trying to minimize the same over his admissible strategies. This kind of game typically occurs in a pursuit-evasion problem where an interceptor tries to destroy a speci c target. Due to quick maneuvering by the evader and the corresponding response by the interceptor the trajectories keep switching rapidly and is generally modelled as a hybrid system (X(t); (t)) described above 12]. Though pursuit-evasion games are generally treated on a nite horizon, we have studied the in nite horizon case here. The corresponding results for the nite horizon case can be derived using analogous (almost identical) arguments. For the zero-sum game we have established existence of randomized optimal strategies for both players. We have then treated a special case where at each mode only one player controls the game (think of billiards, for example). For this special case we have shown the existence of optimal pure strategies. This may have potential applications in token ring networks 4, p. 253]. In such networks each node may be treated as a player and at any time the node having the token controls the game completely. We next consider the nonzero-sum game where each player is trying to maximize his own payo . For player`;`= 1; 2; the payo is E Z 1 0 e ? t r`(X (t); (t); u 1 (t); u 2 (t))dt]:
This kind of game arises in a situation where two economic agents share the same production system which is subject to random failure 10]. For a nonzero-sum game we have established the existence of (Nash) equilibrium. Our results for a nonzero-sum game extends to the several players case. We have treated two players only for notational simplicity.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the technical details of the problems. Zero-sum game is treated in Section 3. Section 4 deals with nonzero-sume case. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION Let V`= 1; 2 be compact metric spaces and U`= P(V`) the space of probability measures on V`endowed with the topology of weak convergence. Let (X( ); ( )) be an R d S-valued process given by dX(t) = b(X(t); (t); u(t))dt + (X(t); (t))dW (t) (2.1a) P( (t + t) = j j (t) = i; (s); X(s); s t) = ij (X(t)) t + 0( t); i 6 = j (2.1b) 
Zero-Sum Game.
Let r : R d S V 1 V 2 ! R be the payo function. We assume that (A2) r is a bounded, continuous function, Lipschitz in its rst argument uniformly with respect to the rest.
When the state of the system is (x; i) 2 R d S and the players 1, 2 choose the actions v 1 2 V 1 ; v 2 2 V 2 , respectively, player 1 receives a payo r (x; i; v 1 ; v 2 ) from player 2. The problem is to nd a strategy for player 1 which will maximize his accumulated income and a strategy for player 2 which will minimize the same quantity. For performance evaluation, we consider the discounted payo on the in nite horizon. Let > 0 be the discount factor. Let (u 1 ; u 2 ) 2 A 1 A 2 and (X( ); ( )) the solution of (2. Clearly the existence of a pair of optimal strategies for both players ensures that the value function exists but the converse need not hold. We will establish the existence of a value function and Markov opimal strategies for both players. Since the addition of a constant to the payo function does not alter the optimal strategies, we may (and will) assume that r 0. NonZero-Sum Game Each player wants to maximize his accumulated income. We again consider the -discounted payo on the in nite horizon. Let (u 1 ; u 2 ) 2 A 1 A 2 . Let (X( ); ( )) be the solution of (2.1) corresponding to (u 1 ( ); u 2 ( )). Then the ( -discounted) payo to player`for the initial condition (x; i) is de ned as We will establish the existence of an equilibrium in Markov strategies. Note that the two-person nonzero-sum game can be extended to the N-person game. We are treating only the two-person case for notational simplicity.
We conclude this section by showing that both the players can con ne their attention to only Markov strategies. To this end we introduce the con- It immediately follows from the above lemma that for the two person zero-sum game no player can improve his payo by going beyond Markov strategies. For the nonzero-sum game there is no notion of value of the game. Di erent pairs of equilibrium strategies may yield varied payo s to the players. However, due to the enormous complexity in implementing a non-Markov strategy both players look for equilibrium in Markov strategies only. ZERO-SUM GAME In this section we will establish Markov optimal strategies for both players. To this end we rst study the corresponding Isaacs equation given by . By elliptic regularity 9, p. 287] applied to (3.3a) it follows that R (x; i) 2 C where k R is a constant independent of R 0 . (The modi cation is needed because of the factor > 0, but it is routine). Repeating the above procedure over and over again we conclude that f R 0 g R 0 >R is uniformly bounded in We now consider a special case where in each discrete state i 2 S, one player controls the game exclusively. In other words, we assume the following (A4) Let S 1 = fi 1 ; ; i m g S; S 2 = fj 1 ; ; j n g S be such that S 1 \ S 2 = and S 1 S 2 = S. Proof. Let M 1 and M 2 be endowed with the metric topology described 
